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explains the fact that although the Japanese are frequently able to surround large bodies of
Chinese troops, they have never yet been able to capture more than a few. The Japanese
military machi ne is thus being weakened by insufficiency of manpower, inadequacy of
resources, the barbarism of her troops, and the general stupidity that has characterized the
conduct of operations. Her offensive continues unabated, but because of the weaknesses
pointed out, her attack must be limited in extent. She can never conquer China. The day will
come indeed already has in some areas when she will be forced into a passive role.
When hostilities commenced, China was passive, but as we enter the second phase of the
war we find ourselves pursuing a strategy of mobile warfare, with both guerrillas and regulars
operating on exterior lines. Thus, with each passing day, we seize some degree of initiative
from the Japanese.
The matter of initiative is especially serious for guerrilla forces, who must face critical
situations unknown to regular troops. The superiority of the enemy and the lack of unity and
experience within our own ranks may be cited. Guerrillas can, however, gain the initiative if
they keep in mind the weak points of the enemy. Because of the enemy's insufficient
manpower, guerrillas can operate over vast territories, because he is a foreigner and a
barbarian, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen; because of the
stupidity of enemy commanders, guerrillas can make full use of their own cleverness. Both
guerrillas and regulars must exploit these enemy weaknesses while, at the same time, our
own are remedied. Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality, sources
of strength. For example, the very fact that most guerrilla groups are small makes it desirable
and advantageous for them to appear and disappear in the enemy's rear. With such activities,
the enemy is simply unable to cope. A similar liberty of action can rarely be obtained by
regular forces.
When the enemy attacks the guerrillas with more than one column, it is difficult for the latter to
retain the initiative. Any error, no matter how slight, in the estimation of the situation is likely to
result in forcing the guerrillas into a passive role. They will then find themselves unable to beat
oft the attacks of the enemy.
It is apparent that we can gain and retain the initiative only b y a correct estimation of the
situation and a proper arrangement of all military and political factors. A too pessimistic
estimate will operate to force us into a passive position, with consequent loss of initiative; an
overly optimistic estimate, with its rash ordering of factors, will produce the same result.
No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative. It is the
intelligent leader who does so after a careful study and estimate of the situation and
arrangement of the military and political factors involved. When a guerrilla unit, through either
a poor estimate on the part of its leader or pressure from the enemy, is forced into a passive
position, its first duty is to extricate itself. No method can be prescribed for this, as the method
to be employed will, in every case, depend on the situation. One can, if necessary, run away.
But there are times when the situation seems hopeless and, in reality, is not so at all. It is at
such times that the good leader recognizes and seizes the moment when he can regain the
lost initiative.
Let us revert to alertness. To conduct one's troops with alertness is an essential of guerrilla
command. Leaders must realize that to operate alertly is the most important factor in gaining
the initiative and vital in its effect of the relative situation that exists between our forces and
those of the enemy. Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the enemy situation, to
the terrain, and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders must be alert to sense changes in these
factors and make necessary modifications in troop dispositions to accord with them. The
leader must be like a fisherman, who, with his nets, is able both to cast them and to pull them
out in awareness of the depth of the water, the strength of the current or the presence of any
obstructions that may foul them. As the fisherman controls his nets through the lead ropes, so
the guerrilla leader maintains contact with control over his units. As the fisherman must
change his position, so must the guerrilla commander. Dispersion, concentration, constant
change of position it is in these ways that guerrillas employ, their strength.
In general, guerrilla units disperse to operate:
When the enemy is in over-extended defence, and sufficient force cannot be concentrated
against him, guerrillas must disperse, harass him, and demoralize him.
When encircled by the enemy, guerrillas disperse to withdraw.
When the nature of the ground limits action, guerrillas disperse.
When the availability of supplies limits action, they disperse.
Guerrillas disperse in order to promote mass movements over a wide area.
Regardless of the circumstances that prevail at the time of dispersal, caution must be
exercised in certain matters:
A relatively large group should be retained as a central force. The remainder of the troops
should not be divided into groups of absolutely equal size. In this way, the leader is in a
position to deal with any circumstances that may arise. Each dispersed unit should have clear
and definite responsibilities. Orders should specify a place to which to proceed, the time of
proceeding, and the place, time, and method of assembly.
Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them, and there is opportunity to
fall upon him and destroy him. Concentration may be desirable when the enemy is on the
defensive and guerrillas wish to destroy isolated detachments in particular localities. By the
term 'concentrate', we do not mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that
necessary for the task. The remaining guerrillas are assigned missions of hindering and
delaying the enemy, of destroys isolated groups, or of conducting mass propaganda.
In addition to the dispersion and concentration of forces, the leader must understand what is
termed 'alert shifting'. When the enemy feels the danger of guerrillas, he will generally send
troops out to attack them. The guerrillas must consider the situation and decide at what time
and at what place they wish to fight. If they find that they cannot fight, they must immediately
shift. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal. For example; after a guerrilla group has
destroyed an enemy detachment at one place, it may be shifted to another area to attack and
destroy a second detachment. Sometimes, it will not be profitable for a unit to become
engaged in a certain area, and in that case, it must move immediately.
When the situation is serious, the guerrilla must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of
the blowing wind. Their tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse the enemy. They must lead
the enemy to believe that they will attack him from the east and north, and they must then
strike him from the west and the south. They must strike, then rapidly disperse. They must
move at night.
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