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real data on debates, no minutes of the
becoming apparent.7 Otherwise, years.9
deliberations of the top Soviet leaders.5 Andropov prepared his reports for the
The normal and extraordinary political
By contrast, among the declassified
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the De- decision-making levels of the party leader-
U.S. government records on the Hungarian
partment of the Central Committee ship received supplementary information
crisis, both published and in archives, re-
(meaning the division responsible for from other parts of the intertwined party-
searchers readily find numerous documents
contact with the foreign Communist par- state organs, most importantly autonomous
describing policy debates, including detailed
ties).8 organs of force such as the army and KGB.
minutes of National Security Council dis-
b. Other embassy personnel worked The reports of the extraordinary level
cussions, as well as serious analytical pa-
on the lower level, gathering information contain numerous errors, mistakes, and faults,
pers prepared by the NSC and various intel-
on special areas of interest to the leader- especially during and immediately after the
ligence agencies.6 Whether comparable
ship and maintaining personal contacts Revolution. Persons and locations cropped
documentation exists on the Soviet side, but
with other sources (primarily with party up which remained in obscurity for the So-
remains off-limits, or whether such items of
figures who had been in Moscow but viet leaders. They received the biased and/
Presidium transcripts on the crisis do not
were not part of the top leadership), and or panic stricken information above all on
exist, was not clarified in the materials de-
their reports usually reached the medium street atrocities written by the usual Hungar-
livered by Yeltsin. In any event, the result
level only. ian informants, especially Hungarian state
is that the crucial factors which determine
In crisis situations intelligence was el- security officers.10 On the other hand the
top-level decision-making can be analyzed
evated to a special level, and on such occa- Soviets also manipulated the news,
only by inference.
sions the party Presidium sent its own mem- Andropov, Serov, and Zhukov in particular.
An additional problem is that the So-
bers as plenipotentiary envoys to the place of The last-named, for example, made no dis-
viet documents only treat the Hungarian
crisis to conduct personal inspections, as- tinction between the fighting civilian insur-
issue in a very narrow sense the context of
sessments, and, on occasion, negotiations. gents and the Hungarian army which never
the international situation makes but a dim
Usually they attempted to maintain secrecy. fought in mass when describing resistance
appearence. Important issues like the Suez
The envoys contacted local leaders first and to the second Soviet intervention after No-
crisis, U.S. behavior, the problems of the
collected information. Then they made rec- vember 4. This exaggeration of the true
East-Central European allies, barely receive
ommendations for decision to Moscow and proportions of resistance was used to justify
mention.
sometimes had the right to take local action, the immense scale of the Soviet interven-
Still, while all these issues require fur-
evidently on the basis of consultation with tion.
ther thorough research, even the selected
the center. Four such extraordinary delega- Thus, the Soviet documents must be
documents permit an illuminating explora-
tions visited Hungary between the summer handled with great circumspection as far as
tion of the thinking, terminology, priorities,
of 1956 and the end of that year: facts are concerned. Contemporary readers
and particular style of conduct between the
1. Mikhail Suslov, 7-14 June 1956 (1 will be astounded by the raw, coarse nature
leadership of the Soviet empire and
report); of the reports, which were frequently written
Moscow s East European satellites at this
2. Anastas Mikoyan, 13-21 July 1956 (6 in primitive party jargon. Hardly camou-
juncture of the Cold War, as well as of the
reports); flaged orders and instructions are confus-
Soviet style of information gathering and
3. Mikoyan, Suslov, Serov, and Gen. ingly intermingled with niceties, com-
crisis management. In normal circum-
Mikhail Malinin (Deputy Chief of Staff radely good advice, and partylike state-
stances, the Soviet leadership gathered in-
of the Soviet Army, who might have ments. Mikoyan obviously differed in this
formation on the satellites through two in-
arrived earlier), 24-31 October 1956 (10 sense from Malenkov and Serov, not to
ner official channels:
reports); mention Andropov. One finds hardly any
a. The higher level, represented by
4. Suslov, Boris Aristov, Georgi trace of contrary opinions from the Hungar-
the ambassador, whose scope of author-
Malenkov and Serov (who was prob- ian side concerning important questions, with
ity included keeping in touch with top
ably on location continuously from Oc- the exception of Imre Nagy during the Revo-
local party leaders. The Soviet ambas-
tober 24), and Marshal I.S. Koniev lution. While differing Hungarian views
sador was at the same time the local
(Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw were noted in the phase of Soviet informa-
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 25
tion gathering, once decisons were taken tion initially appeared manageable. It was decision however, could hardly have been
Moscow s representatives paid little atten- obvious from the Mikoyan group s report made by this point. Yet, Mikoyan signaled
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