[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
North Yemen (YAR) merged with South Yemen (PDRY) in 1990. The
unified Republic of Yemen turned to bandwagoning after soft balancing during
the Gulf Conflict 1990 91. Following some years of struggle for power in the
new republic resulting in the outbreak of a minor civil war in May June 1994,
Yemen chose to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and later joined the global War
on Terrorism.
It was widely debated whether the special US Israeli relationship would
survive the changes following the end of the Cold War (Steinberg 2001). The
US dilemma was highlighted by the formation of the Coalition after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. The coalition was sensitive owing to the participation of
eight Arab states, all of which faced domestic criticism because of this action. In
full understanding with the US, Israel therefore remained outside of the coalition
but was provided with Patriot missiles during the Iraqi Scud campaign in the
beginning of 1991. When the US called for the Madrid Peace Conference after
the war, Israel chose to join the process after a series of procedural manoeuvres
(Hansen 2000a). The special relationship survived, and Israel displayed hard
bandwagoning throughout the period in question.
Egypt displayed hard bandwagoning during the 1990 91 conflict. For the rest
The Middle East 131
of the period, Egypt pursued a soft bandwagoning strategy (although with criti-
cism of the 2003 Iraq War).
While the US-allied Arab states pursued bandwagoning strategies within the
realm of security, they were less inclined to opt for domestic political change,
i.e. democratization. Democratic reforms began almost only to appear after the
fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. Bandwagoning strategies by these
states are no big surprise, because, ceteris paribus, they all enjoyed a high degree
of relative security due to their security ties to the US.
Regarding the former Soviet-allied states, the picture differs considerably.
Iraq, Syria and Libya chose balancing strategies at some point, though the
Syrian strategy was initially one of hard bandwagoning, and the Libyan strategy
ended up as one of hard bandwagoning.23
Two of the other Cold War Soviet allies suffered from internal conflict and
thus refrained from pursuing coherent external strategies. Algeria was subjected
to a low-intensity but bloody civil war during the 1990s and had a low-profile
foreign policy. Afghanistan was subject to civil warfare until the Taliban gained
control over major parts of the country in 1996. After the Taliban regime took
over, the Afghan strategy became a balancing strategy. Afghanistan provided
safe haven for al-Qaida and refused to extradite Osama bin Laden after 9/11. A
US-led airborne invasion in October 2001 resulted, which eventually brought
about the fall of the Taliban regime.
Another previous Soviet ally, the PLO, later the Palestinian Authority, suf-
fered a devastating blow after losing its superpower ally. This loss was aggra-
vated by the initial post-Cold War strategic move by the PLO, namely support
for Iraq and the invasion of Kuwait. This caused additional losses in terms of an
end to support from the conservative Gulf States. The PLO subsequently
changed to a bandwagoning strategy and engaged in the Madrid (later the Oslo)
Peace Process. By the mid-1990s, however, the Palestinian Authority again
changed strategies, now embracing a strategy of soft balancing. In June 2007,
the Palestinians split. Hamas took control over the Gaza Strip, and civil war-like
struggles took place. President Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah, which remained in
control in the West Bank, opted for soft bandwagoning, while the Hamas
resorted to a hard balancing strategy.
Iran, one of the major MENA players, suffered no direct losses in terms of
superpower support due to the end of the Cold War, as it had remained outside
the bipolar camps since the revolution in 1979. Instead, it suffered losses regard-
ing its political room to manoeuvre, because it was no longer protected (in the
eye of the storm) from superpower interference by the bipolar fear of escalation.
In the first half of the years in question, 1989 2007, Iran pursued a soft balanc-
ing strategy, which tilted towards hard balancing by the end of the 1990s. The
full step was taken in the years after 9/11 and 2003, when Iran confronted the
US and the international community by accelerating its nuclear programme. Iran
insisted on uranium enrichment, which led to sanctions. Iran also continued
to support the Hamas and Hezbollah, thereby countering the peace process
initiatives.
132 The Middle East
In sum, the previously pro-US states all chose (different degrees of) band-
wagoning strategies, while the previously Soviet-allied states chose very differ-
ent strategies, ranging from hard balancing to hard bandwagoning, and typically
adopted a new strategy along the way.
The model and state strategies in the MENA region
The states in the MENA region that were exposed to serious losses tended to
pursue strategies of soft or hard balancing between 1989 and 2007. In contrast,
the states on the winning side tended to pursue bandwagoning strategies.
The losers chose different strategies, however, and their strategies varied con-
siderably in terms of degree of opposition, consistency and stability. Libya
pursued a balancing strategy for quite some time but shifted to a soft bandwago-
ning strategy; Iraq persistently pursued a strategy of hard balancing until being
forced to change to hard bandwagoning in 2003; and Syria initially pursued a
strategy of hard bandwagoning but changed to soft balancing in the second half
of the 1990s. None of the case countries or other major losers voluntarily
launched serious domestic democratic or economic reforms during the
1989 2007 period, but Iraq was forced to do so after the 2003 invasion.
Iraq had suffered losses that were aggravated by its post-Iraq Iran War posi-
tion. It was regionally isolated, and although its relationship to the US was toler-
able in the beginning of 1990, its strategic move towards Kuwait brought it into
a deep confrontation with the sole remaining superpower. Its ideological
distance to the US was also very long, being the most authoritarian regime in the
MENA region.
The Iraqi policy of hard balancing after invading Kuwait and initially allow-
ing UN inspection is fully consistent with our expectations. The serious loss of
power as the basic condition provided a balancing incentive and the impact from
a high degree of relative insecurity regionally as well as in relation to the
unipole in combination with great distance provided an incentive to hard bal-
ancing.
However, the massive US pressure beginning in the late 1990s could have
forced Iraq to change its cost-benefit analysis. This pressure meant that Iraq s
relative security further deteriorated, pointing to the choice of balancing.
However, the meagre prospects for a successful outcome could have changed
the Iraqi calculations to favour bandwagoning in the sense of strategic surren-
der , as in the case of Libya. Our model cannot explain why this did not happen
and Iraq was ultimately invaded. The regime was probably convinced that any
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]