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22
HKp
,pb,n
(x) =
f
n
i=n-x
n
Pr(W )i(1 - Pr(W ))n-i.
(17)
i
It should be noted that if a noise occurs on the forward channel then Pr(W ) =
, which happens with probability pf (1 - pb) + pf pb. Thus:
1
2
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